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Abstract
A practical face recognition system demands not only
high recognition performance, but also the capability of
detecting spoofing attacks. While emerging approaches of
face anti-spoofing have been proposed in recent years, most
of them do not generalize well to new database. The gen-
eralization ability of face anti-spoofing needs to be signif-
icantly improved before they can be adopted by practical
application systems. The main reason for the poor gener-
alization of current approaches is the variety of materials
among the spoofing devices. As the attacks are produced
by putting a spoofing display (e.t., paper, electronic screen,
forged mask) in front of a camera, the variety of spoof-
ing materials can make the spoofing attacks quite different.
Furthermore, the background/lighting condition of a new
environment can make both the real accesses and spoofing
attacks different. Another reason for the poor generaliza-
tion is that limited labeled data is available for training in
face anti-spoofing. In this paper, we focus on improving
the generalization ability across different kinds of datasets.
We propose a CNN framework using sparsely labeled data
from the target domain to learn features that are invari-
ant across domains for face anti-spoofing. Experiments on
public-domain face spoofing databases show that the pro-
posed method significantly improve the cross-dataset testing
performance only with a small number of labeled samples
from the target domain.
1. Introduction
In biometric based face recognition systems, spoofing at-
tacks are usually perpetrated using photographs, replayed
videos or forged masks. Despite continuous works on face
anti-spoofing over the years [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6], most of them
limit to the non-realistic intra-database testing scenarios in-
stead of the cross database testing scenarios. In practi-
cal scenario, the environments are not fixed, differences
in light conditions, backgrounds and camera resolutions of
a new environment may make the images captures differ-
ently. Besides, as the spoofing displays can be produced
using different kinds of materials, such as paper, electronic
screen and forged mask, the distributions of spoofing sam-
ples are widely varied. Therefore, it is extremely hard that
an approach trained on one dataset performs well on other
datasets.
Among the numerous published literatures, most of them
focused on hand-crafted features and tried to capture texture
differences between live and spoofing face images from the
perspective of surface reflection and material differences,
such as LBP [7], LBP-TOP [1] and HOG [8]. However,
methods in this category may suffer from poor generaliz-
ability since the texture varies with the spoofing devices.
In [2, 4], the researchers used CNNs to automatically learn
features for face anti-spoofing and have achieved promis-
ing performance. Nevertheless, the CNNs need a large
number of various types of spoofing data to guarantee its
generalization ability. Even the traditional approach for
adapting deep models, fine-tuning, may require hundreds
or thousands of labeled examples for each category that
need to be adapted [9]. Unfortunately, the current pub-
licly available face spoofing datasets, such as Replay At-
tack [7], CASIA-FASD [10], MSU-MFSD [11] and NUAA
[12] are too limited to train a generalized network compared
with the datasets of image classification and face recogni-
tion [13, 14, 15, 15, 16].
However, in the practical application of a face anti-
spoofing product, it is reasonable to assume that the prod-
uct’s new owner will be able to label a handful of exam-
ples for a few types of training samples. Given this cir-
cumstance, we proposed a domain transfer network, aiming
at learning domain-invariant features across two different
datasets for robust face anti-spoofing. We propose to learn
a shared feature subspace where the distributions of the real
access samples (genuine) from different domains, and the
distributions of different types of spoofing attacks (fake)
from different domains are drawn close, respectively. In the
proposed framework, the sufficient labeled source data are
used to learn discriminative representations that distinguish
the genuine samples and the fake samples, meanwhile the
sparsely labeled target samples are fed to the network to cal-
culate the feature distribution distance between the genuine
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samples from the source and the target domain, and between
the fake samples from the source and the target domains,
corresponding to their materials. The kernel approach is
adopted to map the features output from the CNN into a
common kernel space, and the Maximum Mean Discrep-
ancy (MMD) is adopted to measure the distribution distance
between the samples from the source and target domains.
This feature distribution distance is treated as a domain loss
term added to the objective function and minimized along
with training of the network. We provide a comprehen-
sive evaluation on some popular datasets with the proposed
method and show significant performance improvements.
2. Related Work
Existing face anti-spoofing approaches are mainly based
on two cues for the purpose of liveness face detection, the
texture differences between live and spoofing face images
and the fine-grained motions such as eye blinking, mouth
movement and head movement across video frames.
In [17], the researchers utilized the difference of struc-
tural texture between the 2D images and 3D images to de-
tect spoofing attacks based on the analysis of Fourier spec-
tra, where the reflections of light on 2D and 3D surfaces re-
sult in different frequency distributions. Tan et al. [12] used
a variational retinex-based method and the Difference-of-
Gaussian (DoG) filters to extract latent reflectance features
on face images to distinguish fake images from real images.
In [18], Maatta et al. extracted the texture of 2D images
using the multi-scale local binary pattern (LBP) to gener-
ate a concatenated histogram which was fed into a SVM
classifier for genuine/fake face classification. In the later
work, Chingovska et al. [7] applied the LBP operator and
its variation to capture the textural properties of the input
image. However, these method analyze each frame in isola-
tion, not considering the temporal motion cues across video
frames. To make use of the temporal information, Pereira et
al [1]. proposed the LBP-TOP, considering three orthogo-
nal planes intersecting the center of a pixel in theXY direc-
tion, XT direction and Y T direction, where T is the time
axis. According to their experimental results, this multi-
resolution LBP-TOP with SVM classifier achieved the best
HTER of 7.6% on the Replay-Attack dataset.
Though promising performance can be achieved with the
above mentioned hand-crafted features in intra-dataset pro-
tocol, a new dataset of different domain may result in severe
performance degradation, since many hand-crafted features
are designed specifically and can not be easily transferred to
new conditions [19]. In order to obtain features with better
generalization ability, quite a few researchers used the deep
convolutional neural network (CNN) for face anti-spoofing
[2, 20, 21, 22]. The CNNs can automatically learn fea-
tures and obtain discriminative cues between genuine and
fake faces. If sufficient data from various domains is avail-
Figure 1: The distributions of genuine samples and two
types of fake samples (print and video) from the database
of MSU-MFSD (a) and Replay-Attack (b).
able, the CNN-based methods can achieve performance
with fairly good generalization ability. Unfortunately, the
current publicly available face anti-spoofing datasets are too
limited to train a generalized network due to the difficulty
in obtaining labeled training samples, the variety of materi-
als of spoofing devices also enhance the domain shift in the
distribution of data representations.
To bridge the gap between two different distributions,
many approaches have been proposed based on the ideas
of domain adaptation [23, 24, 25, 26]. Multimodal deep
learning architectures have been proposed to learn domain
invariant representations in [27]. However, this method per-
formed primarily in a generative context and did not lever-
age the full representation power of supervised CNN rep-
resentations. In [28], Ghifary et al. proposed pre-training
with a denoising auto encoder, then train a two-layer net-
work simultaneously with the MMD domain confusion loss.
Nevertheless, the learned network is relatively shallow and
therefore lacks the strong semantic representation which is
learned by directly optimizing with a supervised deep CNN.
In [25], Tzeng et al. proposed a new CNN architecture
which introduces an adaptation layer and an additional do-
main confusion loss for classification. They use MMD both
to select the depth and width of the architecture while using
it as a regularizer during fine-tuning, and achieved state-of-
the-art performance on the standard visual domain adapta-
tion benchmark.
3. Deep Domain Transfer Network
The idea of domain adaptation have been success-
fully applied in many other fields [23, 29], similar ideas,
however, have never been used in the study of face
anti-spoofing, even current face anti-spoofing approaches
severely suffered from the problem of dataset bias. In or-
der to remove the dataset bias and bridge the gap between
distributions from different domains with the limited train-
ing samples, we proposed a deep domain transfer frame-
work for face anti-spoofing with kernel based metric. Ker-
Figure 2: The flowchart of the proposed framework, where every input batch contains half the source images and half the
target images. Features of the two domains output from the last pooling layer are used to calculate the distribution distance
with kernel based MMD. The network is trained using the classification loss along with the distribution distance which is
taken as domain loss.
nel based metric has already been used in many works for
the measurement of distribution distance [30, 31, 32]. If a
suitable kernel is found, the input data can be mapped into a
convenient feature space, and the distance between different
distributions will be better quantified.
We propose to use deep Convolutional Neural Network
to extract the discriminative features of input images. We
argue that the feature distributions of different datasets are
different in feature subspace that learned by the shared fea-
ture extraction layer. Figure 1 illustrates the feature distri-
butions of three principal components with respect to two
different datasets, the features are learned by CNN hidden
layer. It is shown that the distributions of the genuine sam-
ples and the two types of fake smaples in the learned fea-
ture subface are vary from dataset to dataset. The proposed
framework is outlined in Figure 2.
Let x ∈ Rd be a d-dimension column vector. xs ∈ Rd
and xt ∈ Rd are the data points in the source and the target
datasets, respectively. Suppose that the source-domain data
Ds = {(xs1, ys1), ..., (xsns , ysns)} and the target-domain data
Dt =
{(xt1, yt1), ..., (xtnt , ytnt)}, where ns and nt are the numbers
of the data points. We denote the representation of the
last pooling layer as φ(·). Therefore, the representations of
source-domain points, xs ∈ Rd, and target-domain points
xt ∈ Rd, can be represented as φ(xs) and φ(xt), respec-
tively. Suppose K is the kernel of a reproduction Hilbert
space Hk of functions. Then the MMD in Hk between the
distributions of P and Q is [33]:
MMD2K(P,Q) := Exp,x′p [K(xp, x
′
p)] + Exq,x′q [K(xq, x
′
q)]
− 2Exp,xq [K(xp, xq)]
(1)
where xp, x′p
iid∼ P and xq, x′q iid∼ Q. Many kernels,
such as the Gaussian RBF, are characteristic [34, 35],
which indicates the MMD is a metric, and in particular
that MMDK(P,Q) = 0 if and only if P = Q. Given
Xp = {X1p , ..., Xmp } iid∼ P and Xq = {X1q , ..., Xmq } iid∼ Q,
one estimator of MMDK(Xp, Xq) is:
ˆMMDK
2
(Xp, Xq) :=
1
m/2
∑
i 6=i′
K(Xip, X
i
′
p )
+
1
m/2
∑
j 6=j′
K(Xjq , X
j
′
q )
− 1
m/2
∑
i 6=j′
K(Xip, X
j
q )
(2)
This estimator is unbiased, and has nearly minimum vari-
ance among unbiased estimators [33]. Just take the feature
representations φ(xs) and φ(xt) as P and Q, respectively,
the kernel based MMD between the features of source-
domain and target-domain samples can be calculated ac-
cordingly. In our experiments, the mixture of RBF kernels
were chosen for the computation of distribution distance
based MMD.
As Figure 2 shows, the proposed framework minimizes
the distance between different domains, as well as the clas-
sification errors among genuine and fake samples. The fea-
tures learned should be domain-invariant across domains to
achieve good classification results on dataset of either the
source domain or the target domain. If no labeled target
domain data are available, the objection loss is defined as:
Luns = LC(XS , y) + λMMD2K(XS , XT ) (3)
where XS , XT denotes the source-domain data and target-
domain data, respectively, y denotes the labels of source-
domain data. LC(XS , y) is the classification loss on the
labeled source-domain data, and MMD2K(XS , XT ) is the
Table 1: The training, testing and development sets contained in databases of Replay-Attack and MSU-MFSD.
Replay-Attack-fixed MSU-MFSDAdverse Controlled
Genuine Attack Genuine Attack Genuine AttackVideo Paper Video Paper Video Paper
Train 30 30*4 30 30 30*4 30 30 30*2 30
Test 40 40*4 40 40 40*4 40 20 20*2 20
Devel 30 30*4 30 30 30*4 30 20 20*2 20
domain loss between the source data XS and target data
XT . The regulation parameter λ determines how strongly
we would like to confuse the domains.
In the situation of face anti-spoofing, spoofing images
were usually obtained using different types of devices that
have different materials of surfaces, i.e., print photo, elec-
tronic screen, forged mask, which we named spoofing
modality in this paper. If sparsely labeled data from the
target domain is available, we could define the objection
function by a intra-modality way. Specifically, the source
samples and target samples are divided into several subsets
corresponding to the material of their spoofing surfaces (e.t,
print paper, video screen, mask). Then, the MMD is cal-
culated between different modalities. Therefore, the semi-
supervised objection loss is:
Lsemis = LC(XS , y) + λMMD2K(XrealS , XrealT )
+ λ
N∑
i=1
MMD2K(X
i
S , X
i
T )
(4)
where XrealS and X
real
T represent the real samples from the
source and target domain, respectively, and N is the num-
ber of spoofing modalities in the database. This objective
function can be optimized by Adam algorithm [36]. The
Adam offers a computationally way for gradient-based op-
timization of stochastic objective functions, aiming at to-
wards machine learning problems with large datasets and/or
high-dimensional parameter spaces. It is robust and well-
suited to a wide range of non-convex optimization problems
[36].
We build the proposed Convnet based on AlexNet [37],
which contains five convolutional and max pooling layers,
and three fully connected layers. A ”Two-Half” strategy
is proposed for the training of the proposed framework.
Specifically, in every training batch, one half is the source
data and the other half is the target data, as illustrated in
Figure 2. Since only a few target samples are available,
we randomly picked and copied these target samples to en-
sure the two domains have the same number of samples.
During the training process, the labeled samples from the
source domain are used to learn discriminative features for
the distinguish of genuine and fake images, while the tar-
get samples are used to shrink the domain variance against
the source domain, corresponding to the modalities, respec-
tively. Owning to the two terms of joint loss, the pro-
posed deep domain adaptation network could learn repre-
sentations that are effectively discriminative between gen-
uine and fake samples due to the classification loss, while
still remaining invariant to domain shift due to the domain
loss.
4. Experiments
In this section, we first give a brief description of two
benchmark datasets, Replay-Attack [7] and MSU-MFSD
[11]. After that, we report the performance evaluation of
the proposed method on the two datasets. We follow the
protocols provided by these two datasets.
4.1. Experimental Settings and Datasets
To avoid any influences from the background, only the
face region of each image was cropped based on eye coor-
dinates and used as input. The eye coordinates were ob-
tained by a facial landmarks detection algorithm available
on the internet. All the input face images were resized to
224 × 224, and the regulation parameter λ was set as 0.5.
Batch normalization layer was used to overcome internal
covariate shift. The mixture of Gaussian RBF kernels were
chosen for the calculation of the domain loss. The mixed
kernel function is a sum of Gaussian RBF kernels with fixed
bandwidths 2, 5, 10, 20, 40 and 80.
MSU-MFSD: This dataset consists of 280 video record-
ings of genuine and attack faces. The recordings were taken
from 35 individuals using two types of cameras, with differ-
ent resolutions (640× 480 and 720× 480). For the real ac-
cesses, each subject has two video recordings captured with
the Android and Laptop cameras. For the video attacks,
a high definition video was taken for each subject using a
Canon camera and a iPhone camera. The videos taken with
the Canon camera were then replayed on iPad Air screen to
generate the HD replay attacks while the videos recorded
by the iPhone mobile were replayed itself to generate the
mobile replay attacks. For the printed attacks, the pictures
were printed on A3 Paper using an HP colour printer. The
35 subjects (280 videos) of the MSU-MFSD dataset were
divided into training (120 videos) and testing (160 videos)
Table 2: Comparison results of inter-test between different pairs of datasets. The training set of the first column are used to
train the model, whereas the testing set of the second column are used for model testing.
Datasets Metrics Methods
Train Test LBPu28,1 LBP -TOP
u2
8,8,8,1,1,1 DoG DTCNN(proposed)
Replay-attack Replay-attack HTERe(%) 22.50 24.00 24.42 20.00
(adverse) (controlled) AUC(%) 77.50 76.00 75.58 80.00
Replay-attack MSU- HTERe(%) 45.83 47.50 36.36 25.83
(adverse) MFSD AUC(%) 54.17 52.50 63.64 74.17
MSU- Replay-attack HTERe(%) 45.50 46.50 48.58 27.50
MFSD (controlled) AUC(%) 54.50 53.50 51.42 72.50
subdatasets, respectively. The training dataset contains 30
real access videos and 90 attack videos while the testing
dataset contains 40 real accesses and 120 attacks.
Replay-Attack: This dataset consists of 1200 videos that
include 200 real access videos and 1000 attack videos. The
attacks were taken under 2 different illumination conditions
(controlled and adverse) and 2 support conditions (hand and
fixed). Under the same condition, a high resolution pic-
ture and video were taken for each person. Three types of
attacks were designed: (1) print attack, (2) mobile attack,
and (3) highdef (high definition) attack. The evaluation
protocol splits the dataset into training (360 videos), test-
ing (480 videos) and development (360 videos) subdatasets.
The training and development datasets contain 60 real ac-
cess videos and 300 attack videos each, whereas the testing
subdataset contains 80 real accesses and 400 attacks. In our
experimetns, only the attacks that using fixed-support were
used.
4.2. Performance measure
We evaluate the adaptation ability of the proposed trans-
fer network in this section. Half Total Error Rate (HTER)
was used as the metric in our experiments to keep consis-
tent to previous work. The HTER is half of the sum of
the False Rejection Rate (FRR) and the False Acceptance
Rate (FAR). Since both False Acceptance Rate (FAR) and
False Rejection Rate (FRR) depend on a threshold τ , in-
creasing the FAR will usually reduce the FRR and vice-
versa, we followed previous works [2, 38], and used the
development set to determine the threshold τ correspond-
ing to Equal Error Rate (ERR) for the computing of HTER.
Unfortunately, there is no development set in MSU-MFSD
dataset. In this case, we equally split the testing set into
a couple, namely the development set and the new testing
set. The split datasets are shown in table 1. Observing from
table 1, there are 30, 40 and 30 subjects used for training,
testing an development in Replay-Attack database, respec-
tively, while the training, testing and development datasets
in MSU-MFSD each contains 30, 20 and 20 subjects, re-
spectively. The testing accuracy (ACC) achieved by each
methods is also calculated for comparison.
4.3. Cross-Databases Spoofing Detection
For face anti-spoofing, the adaptation ability from one
dataset to another is crucial for practical application. In this
part, we evaluate this ability by cross-dataset testing (inter-
test), namely the model is firstly trained using the samples
from dataset A (source), and then tested on dataset B (tar-
get). The Replay-Attack and the MSU-MFSD databases
were used to evaluate the proposed method. Images in
Replay-Attack were divided into two subdatasets according
to their illumination conditions (adverse or controlled), and
then, we could obtain three datasets: MSU-MFSD, Replay-
Attack-controlled and Replay-Attack-adverse. Replay-
Attack-controlled is the subdataset of Replay-Attack where
images are taken with the light controlled, whereas Replay-
Attack-adverse is the other subdataset of Replay-Attack
with the light uncontrolled. For each of the three datasets,
the images were split into three subsets, the training, test-
ing and development set. To execute the experiments in
inter-test fashion, the training set of dataset A was used
to train the CNN models or train the SVM classifiers,
whereas the testing set from dataset B was used for test-
ing. Three groups of inter-test performance were evalu-
ated: Repaly-Attack-adverse vs Replay-Attack-controlled,
Repaly-Attack adverse vs MSU-MFSD, and MSU-MFSD
vs Replay-Attack-controlled.
We consider the situation that the labeled data from tar-
get domain is limited for training. In our experiments, we
only randomly selected one labeled subject from the target
dataset for training. The video frames, including genuine
and fake, were stacked and copied to the same number with
the training samples from source domain. Because the input
data were video clips, each contained a number of consecu-
tive frames, we took all the consecutive frames for the train-
ing of the network for the purpose of data argumentation.
However, in the testing phase, the output probabilities of the
consecutive frames with respect to the same subject were
averaged to determine the categorization of each video clip.
Three popular methods, LBPu28,1 [7], LBP -TOP
u2
8,8,8,1,1,1,
[1] and DoG [10], were implemented to compare with the
proposed method. The features captured by the three meth-
ods are all fed into SVM to obtain the final classification
results. For the LBP method, all the consecutive frames
of each video clip of the training set were used to extract
the 59-dimensional holistic features, and to train the SVM
classifier. The final results were achieved on the test set by
averaging the probabilities of all the consecutive frames per
video clip. The features of LBP-TOP were extracted per
video clip, as this method involved the spatio-temporal in-
formation from video sequences. For the Dog operator, 30
frames of each video clip were randomly selected to train
the SVM classifier to avoid high dimensionality of the DoG
features, followed by the procedures of the original liter-
ature [10]. The standard CNN (stdCNN) was also imple-
mented to compared with the three methods, the stdCNN
has the same architecture with the proposed framework only
without the domain loss layer.
The inter-test results regarding these methods are first
summarized in table 2 to evaluate their generalization abil-
ity on the three datasets. For Replay-Attack-adverse and
Replay-Attack-controlled datasets, only the illumination
condition is different, other factors like individuals and
spoofing materials are keep unchanged, therefore the do-
main shift is not serious between these two datasets. This
is the reason why all the four approaches achieved the best
performance by testing across these two datasets. However,
the MSU-MSFD database is totally different from Replay-
Attack database, where the individuals, spoofing materials
and illumination conditions are all different. As a result,
the domain shift between these two databases are quite seri-
ous. The performances achieved by the four approaches are
relatively lower across there two databases.
4.4. Intra-test vs. Inter test
To illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed method,
we compared the intra-test performance with inter-test per-
formance regarding the same method, LBP, LBP-TOP, DoG
and stdCNN. Suppose we evaluate the performance across
dataset A and dataset B, then the intra-test was executed by
using the training and testing set from A for the training and
testing of the model. However, for the inter-test procedure,
we used the training set from A and the testing set from B
to train and test the model, respectively.
Figure 3 reports the accuracy of intra-test and inter-test
by LBP, LBP-TOP, DoG, stdCNN and the proposed method
(DTCNN), respectively. As can be seen, all of the meth-
ods obtained satisfying performance in the fashion of intra-
test, the CNN even achieved nearly perfect performance
(99.68%) on Replay-Attack database. However, when intra-
test on MSU-MFSD, we observed the training accuracy is
nearly 100%, while the testing accuracy degraded signifi-
cantly to 87.62%. The main reason for such a performance
decline is over-fitting due to short of training samples.
The best inter-test performances were still achieved
when testing across Replay-Attack-adverse and Replay-
Attack-controlled (Adver vs. Contrl). Compared with the
results of intra-test, there was a significant degeneration of
the performance of inter-test by the standard CNN (blue vs.
green bar graph in Figure 3(d)). The declined accuracy even
reached up to 49.52% when testing across Replay-Attack-
adverse and MSU-MFSD (Adver vs. MFSD). However,
when using the proposed method (DTCNN) for inter-test
(blue vs. yellow bar graph in Figure 3(d)), there was a con-
siderably boost of the performance compared with the stan-
dard CNN. The improved accuracy are 12.51%, 24.87% and
14.1% for Adver vs. Contrl, Adver vs. MFSD and MFSD
vs. Contrl, respectively.
Overall, the results of LBP, LBP-TOP, DoG and the
standard CNN show that they are not able to well handle
the cross-database challenge. This is because LBP, LBP-
TOP and DoG are hand-crafted features which are designed
specifically and can not be easily transferred to new condi-
tion. For the standard CNNs, the features learned are spe-
cific to the training dataset provided, it may achieve superb
performance on the data from the training domain, however,
the performance may degrade considerably if testing on a
total different dataset. Different from the standard CNNs,
the proposed method can make use of the domain informa-
tion from the target dataset, bridging the gap between the
feature distributions and hence obtaining satisfying perfor-
mance on the target set, only with a very few labeled sam-
ples provided from the target domain.
5. Summary and Conclusion
Cross-database face anti-spoofing replicates real appli-
cation scenarios, and is a challenge for biometrics anti-
spoofing. Although many of the existing methods pro-
posed can achieve excellent performance in the way of non-
realistic intra-database testing, few of them can achieve
comparable performance on the dataset of other domain. To
bridge the gap between the datasets from different domains,
we proposed a CNN framework that effectively adapts to
a new domain with sparsely labeled target domain data for
face anti-spoofing. The proposed network can learn a in-
variant feature space for the source and target samples by
optimizing an objective that simultaneously minimizes clas-
sification loss and the domain loss. As a result, the model
trained with the labeled source data can also achieve satis-
factory performance on the target dataset. Experiments on
the datasets of Replay-Attack and MSU-MFSD showed the
proposed framework greatly enhance the performance by
Figure 3: The accuracy of intra- and inter test achieved by LBP (a), LBP-TOP (b), DoG (c) and stdCNN vs. DTCNN (d),
where stdCNN stands for the standard CNN, and DTCNN represents for the domain transferred CNN.
cross-dataset testing, with only a few labeled samples from
the target domain. The proposed method could open new
perspectives for the future research of face anti-spoofing.
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